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Fear has been used to convince people to behave
securely in a variety of cybersecurity domains. In
this study, we tested the use of fear appeals, together
with threat and coping appraisal components separately
and together, on password hygiene behaviors. Fear
did indeed elicit the anticipated response: people had
higher levels of behavioral intention to engage in better
password hygiene. Unfortunately, we also detected a
largely negative affective response to the appeals. Fear,
as a short-lived emotion, can indeed be effective in the
short term. Snapshot-like studies, like the one reported
here, might lead us to conclude that fear is indeed
indicated and efficacious. Yet, it may backfire in the long
term due to the negative long term affects it can trigger.
1. Introduction
Passwords have been used to authenticate humans
since we started using computers, while fear appeals
have been around for centuries. Fear has been used
by religions, in public health messaging, and latterly
in cybersecurity to persuade people to change their
behaviors [1]. All of these efforts take the efficacy of
fear, as a behavioral change tool, for granted. This
might be because people often do respond to fear, visibly
taking the actions they are coerced into taking.
Even so, it is rare for anyone to consider the
empirical evidence attesting to the long-term power or
limitations of induced fear. Might fear merely appear
to work, being a palliative instead of an intervention?
Does fear lead to permanent behavioral change? Might
the short-term changes in behavior subsequent to
administration of a fear appeal be misleading us? These
are questions that beg to be answered.
An example of the negative consequences of
fear appeals are manifesting in the United Kingdom
(UK). The UK government’s Behavioural Insights Unit
actively advised the government to utilize fear in order
to persuade the British public to comply with lockdown
and other pandemic regulations [2]. This use of fear
achieved its aims: the British public accepted the initial
lockdown, and the many extensions that occurred over
the following 15 months. Vaccine uptake has been
exemplary. Yet, a number of negative consequences are
now emerging and the UK public are the most frightened
of COVID in the world1. Such levels of anxiety cannot
be healthy or desirable. Dodsworth makes a strong
argument that fear “should not be weaponised” arguing
that this particular emotion, when weaponized, creates a
great deal of collateral damage.
We set out to determine whether Dodsworth’s
admonition also applies to the use of fear in the cyber
domain. We focus on the use of fear in encouraging
better password hygiene. This is to help us determine
how, when, where, why, and in what context fear
appeals may be most effective, desirable, and ethical
[3, 4]. In this study, we employed a randomized
controlled between-subjects design with three treatment
groups to test the efficacy of fear appeals in changing
behavioral intentions with respect to three password
hygiene behaviors.
We found that fear did indeed lead to stronger
passwords. However, it also led to higher levels of
negative types of state affect for the two groups that
were exposed to the fear component, as compared to
the two groups that did not receive the fear appeal.
Section 2 reviews related research. Section 3 describes
the methods we used, with Section 4 identifying the
materials employed. Section 5 reports on the findings
with Section 6 discussing them and limitations. Section
7 concludes and suggests future work.
2. Related Research
2.1. Affect
Throughout the literature, affect has been defined
and articulated in a number of ways. It has often
been used interchangeably with mood and emotion (e.g.,
1https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2020/05/
05/britons-scared-coronavirus-infection-rest-world/





[5, 6]). Although this is understandable given their
interdependence, it can make it challenging when one
study may mean something quite different than another
with respect to the use of these terms.
In the current study, emotion can be viewed as a
short-lived and relatively intense reaction to a stimulus.
Emotion may vary significantly over relatively short
time periods. It may eventually become mood, which
will depend on the frequency, intensity, and context of
the experienced emotion(s). In contrast, mood is viewed
as longer-lasting and milder in intensity [5].
Both emotion and mood are considered affective
states [6]. Examples of affective states include: guilt,
hostility, fear, fatigue, surprise, sadness, attentiveness,
serenity, shyness, joviality, and self-assurance [7].
However, in addition to affective states, there is also
trait affect, which represents a generally more stable and
life-long type of affect that changes very little over time,
similar to personality in many respects [8].
Differences in persistence is one way in which
different types of affect may vary from one another.
However, affect may also vary in the extent to which it is
related to the decision at hand or in response to a specific
stimulus. Incidental affect is a type of affect that is not
related to the current judgment or stimulus, but can still
influence it [9]. While trait affect is always an incidental
type of affect, emotion and mood may or may not be
incidental, depending on the particular circumstances.
In contrast to incidental affect, integral affect is
relevant to the current choice, judgment, or stimulus
[9, 6]. This is seen when someone anticipates regretting
a decision, such as betting on a team. This may result in
a change in their betting behavior, influencing the size
of the wager [10]. Loewenstein et al. [11] has termed
this ‘anticipated emotion’. Anticipatory emotions, on
the other hand, include immediate visceral reactions
to threats (e.g., fear) [11]. Both anticipatory and
anticipated emotions are considered types of integral
affect as they are directly related to, and triggered by,
the current judgment or stimulus.
2.2. Fear Appeals
Fear is invoked when a threat exhibits a number of
characteristics: (1) it is important to the person, (2) it
is negatively valenced, (3) the threat is impending, and
(4) it requires the person to engage in some kind of
effort to offset the threat with a recommended action
[1]. Fear, as an emotion, undoubtedly exerts an influence
on humans [12], hence its appropriation as a behavioral
change intervention across a range of domains.
Fear is used in behavioral change interventions in the
belief that the elicited fear will convince people to do
what the fear appeal deployer wants them to do [12].
The idea is that they will take action in order to reduce
levels of fear.
Renaud and Dupuis [1] reviewed the use of fear
appeals in the cybersecurity domain. They reported that
the majority of the studies take a snapshot, presenting
participants with a fear appeal and then asking a number
of questions. Some observed subsequent behaviors.
Very few studies returned to the participants after a
significant period of time to determine the whether the
impact of the fear appeal endured. None checked that
the recommended behavior the fear appeal was trying to
trigger was feasible to the recipient.
A number of the studies reviewed by Renaud and
Dupuis [1] used fear to strengthen passwords [13, 14, 15,
16]. These generally reported that the fear appeals were
effective, but most measured behavioral intention via a
survey question or via self-report. Likewise, very few
measured the level of fear that may have been induced,
let alone other more enduring emotions.
One of the exceptions with respect to the
measurement of fear was Boss et al. [17], who
adapted items from Milne et al. in reporting their
first study [18]. The underlying assumption was that
fear was being measured. However, the origin of the
items they used was not provided by Milne et al.,
nor was any information provided with respect to the
development and validation (i.e., construct validity)
of these items [18]. The four items used to measure
fear included the descriptors ‘worried’, ‘frightened’,
‘anxious’, and ‘scared’. In their second study, they
adapted items from Osman et al. [19], which was an
examination of an instrument originally designed by
McCracken et al. [20]. However, the original subscale
that examined fear included 10 items, while Boss et
al. used six. It is also worth noting that the original
instrument, the Pain Anxiety Symptoms Scale (PASS),
was developed to measure the fear of pain. The fear
of something real physiologically (i.e., pain) and not
abstract (i.e., security [21]), may not be the same thing.
Hence, measuring them in the same manner may not be
appropriate. Despite any possible issues with how fear
was measured in their studies, they did find that fear
could be elicited and measured within the context of a
fear appeal study. This should be the rule rather than
the exception in carrying out these kinds of studies.
Another study suggests that how a fear appeal is
deployed may make a difference in its efficacy. Vance et
al. examined the use of four different types of password
interfaces: 1) control; 2) interactive password strength
meter; 3) static fear appeal treatment, and 4) interactive
fear appeal treatment [22]. The interactive fear appeal
messaging was the only treatment that demonstrated
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significant improvement in password creation. The
reason for this is later delineated in Vance et al. [23].
While the secondary nature of many security tasks
has long been recognized (e.g., [21]), the primary
or secondary nature of fear appeals while performing
security tasks has not been closely examined prior to
[23]. They articulate the role of engagement with the
fear appeal and how it is already high when the fear
appeal is part of a primary task, but inherently low when
that task or the appeal itself is secondary in nature. By
increasing the level of engagement between the end user
with the fear appeal, higher degrees of success will be
found in either type of task, but will perhaps be most
pronounced in secondary tasks where engagement has a
low baseline.
The dynamic deployment of fear appeals was also
found to be quite effective by Jenkins et al. [24]. Similar
to Vance et al.’s, feedback in the form of a fear appeal
was provided immediately as characters were entered
into the keyboard during password creation. Their focus
was on password reuse. 88.41% of participants that
received the fear appeal choosing to create a unique
password compared to only 4.45% of those that did not
receive the fear appeal. Thus, within the cybersecurity
domain there may be opportunities to provide immediate
feedback in the form of a fear appeal and such feedback
may be highly effective. Passwords lend themselves
to such immediate feedback, while other protective
behaviors in cybersecurity may be more difficult to
replicate in a similar manner (e.g., back-ups of data).
2.3. Protection Motivation Theory
Fear appeals have been used for centuries and
have been examined using a range of theoretical
approaches designed to better understand human
behavior, including Protection Motivation Theory
(PMT) [25]. PMT helps explain why some individuals
may engage in a recommended action with the purpose
of reducing the threat, while others may be more
concerned with reducing the level of fear they may feel,
engaging in ‘danger control’ rather than ‘fear control’.
Rogers developed PMT in 1975 as an extension
of expectancy-value theory [26]. Self-efficacy was
later added to the theory, given its role in successfully
accounting for one’s willingness to engage in a specific
behavior [27, 26]. PMT consists of threat appraisal
and coping appraisal. Threat appraisal consists of
the constructs: ‘perceived threat severity’, ‘perceived
threat vulnerability’, and ‘rewards’, the latter of which
has rarely been used in practice [28]. Coping
appraisal consists of the constructs ‘self-efficacy’,
‘response efficacy’, and ‘response costs’ [29]. The
threat appraisal and coping appraisal components are
examined separately and then together in this study. The
context in which this is done is by examining the threat
of having one’s passwords compromised.
2.4. Passwords
Most users prefer passwords over alternative
authentication mechanisms, probably due to their
familiarity and the ubiquity of text entry mechanisms
[30]. Other authentication types, such as biometrics
or tokens, often involve extra expense or additional
hardware, and are sometimes error-prone. Hence,
passwords are the most popular authentication
mechanism for both end users and developers [31].
The rules related to the format of the password
are generally simple, but vary considerably in their
implementation from one program or application being
used to another. These authentication systems usually
specify a minimum length of the password, complexity
requirements, and that they should be kept secure.
However, there are few mechanisms in place to ensure
an individual creates unique passwords. Likewise, most
individuals do not use password managers to simplify
such requirements and/or guidelines [32].
2.5. Research Model
The research undertaken here focuses on two
objectives. First, to assess the degree to which different
conditions presented to participants may impact the
efficacy of the target behaviors within a PMT model.
Second, to determine whether it is fear by itself that is
elicited or one or more other emotions.
For the first objective, and consistent with other
research that has employed PMT within the information
security domain (e.g., [33]), we propose the following
five hypotheses:
H1: Higher levels of perceived threat severity
related to having one’s passwords compromised will be
associated with higher levels of intent to perform the
target password hygiene behaviors.
H2: Higher levels of perceived threat vulnerability
related to having one’s passwords compromised will be
associated with higher levels of intent to perform the
target password hygiene behaviors.
H3: Higher levels of self-efficacy related to
performing the target password hygiene behaviors will
be associated with higher levels of intent to perform the
target password hygiene behaviors.
H4: Higher levels of response efficacy related to
one’s belief in the effectiveness the target password
hygiene behaviors will be associated with higher levels
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of intent to perform the target password hygiene
behaviors.
H5: Higher levels of perceived response costs
related to performing the target password hygiene
behaviors will be associated with lower levels of intent
to perform the target password hygiene behaviors.
The second objective will be evaluated by comparing
the mean values of the different groups for each of the
higher order and lower order dimensions of state affect
measured. Given the complexity inherent to emotions
and the elicitation thereof, we expect participants that
were exposed to a treatment that had a fear component
to it would see increased levels of other negative
emotions and decreased levels of positive emotions
when compared to participants that were not exposed to
a fear component. Therefore, we propose the following
two hypotheses:
H6: Participants in experimental groups that
received a fear component will have higher levels of
negative types of state affect other than fear when
compared to participants in the non-fear groups.
H7: Participants in experimental groups that
received a fear component will have lower levels
of positive types of state affect when compared to
participants in the non-fear groups.
3. Methods
The current study measures self-reports of behavior
before the treatment (or control) and then behavioral
intentions after the treatment (or control) has been
completed. Although this study does not address all
of the issues raised by Renaud and Dupuis [1], an
important contribution of this study is to separate the
core components of a fear appeal into two distinct
elements, threat appraisal components (perceived threat
severity and perceived threat vulnerability) and coping
appraisal components (self-efficacy, response efficacy,
and response costs). Another important contribution
is the examination of the specific types of state affect
elicited within each of the four groups and how they
compare to one another in this regard.
3.1. Participants
Prior to collecting data from participants,
Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval was
sought and obtained. Participants were recruited from
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) and the survey
was hosted on the Qualtrics survey platform. Compared
to other recruitment methods, MTurk has been shown to
be both efficient and reliable with respect to participant
recruitment so long as quality control measures are
used, such as attention check questions [34, 35].
In the current study, two automated quality control
questions were used. If a participant failed either
of them then the survey would end with a message
explaining that they had failed a quality control
question. Additionally, toward the end of the survey
we had an open-ended question that was also used
as a de facto quality control measure. By sorting
them in alphabetical order and reading through the
responses provided, we are able to detect cases in which
automation was likely used. Since each version of the
survey required the participant to watch one of four
different videos, we used a timing option within the
Qualtrics survey platform to prevent individuals from
advancing to the next question before a time equivalent
to the length of the video had elapsed. Finally, we
limited eligibility to participate in the survey to MTurk
workers that had an approval rate of 98% or greater and
had previously completed at least 1,000 HITs (human
intelligence tasks).
A pilot study with 107 participants was used to
reveal any problems with question wording and survey
flow, as well as to ensure fair compensation for
participants. No significant issues were detected and
compensation for participants was set at $2.50. The
compensation provided was considered fair given the
responses provided to a compensation question included
at the end of the survey with 91.2% of participants
believing that the compensation provided was either
comparable (69.9%) or easier for the money (21.3%)
when compared to similar projects they had previously
completed on MTurk with a small number (8.8%)
believing that more effort was required in comparison.
Of the 811 participants that began the survey, 1.5%
failed one of the quality control measures. As a
result, there were 799 valid responses that were used
for subsequent analysis. Participants were mostly
evenly divided between the four groups based on
a random assignment feature within Qualtrics: (1)
Control (N=202); (2) Threat appraisal components
only (N=201); (3) Coping appraisal components only
(N=195), and (4) Combined threat and coping appraisal
components (N=201).
Most participants stated they were White (77.2%),
followed by Asian / Pacific Islander (8.4%), Black /
African American (8.1%), Hispanic (4.3%), Other /
Multi-Racial (1.6%), and Native American / Alaskan
Native / Indigenous (0.4%). Approximately half of
our participants identified as male (51.2%), followed by
female (47.8%), non-binary or third gender (0.6%), or
preferred not to say (0.4%). Most of the participants
(54.9%) were 40 or older with the remaining participants
(45.1%) between the ages of 18 and 39.
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4. Materials
Existing instrumentation was used when possible.
If this was not feasible, then previously developed and
validated items were used and adapted for the current
study. This included the questions related to the PMT
constructs [36, 37, 18]. When this was not possible,
measurement tools were developed and validated, such
as the videos and the target password hygiene behaviors.
4.1. Objective 1: Password Hygiene Behaviors
As noted earlier, there is significant disagreement
on the specific behaviors and practices one should
engage in related to performing good password hygiene.
Thus, the Delphi technique was employed with a group
of 11 subject matter experts (SMEs) that engage in
cybersecurity a majority of their time through a typical
workday. The Delphi technique has been employed in
information systems and cybersecurity based research
before (e.g., [38] and is a common technique employed
to reach consensus. Three rounds were performed with
the first round being the most open. SMEs were able
to provide their own ideas related to measures necessary
for good password hygiene during the first round. The
second round included these responses along with other
measures found in the literature and from organizations.
Consensus became important during the second and
third rounds. Significant disagreement was found for
most of the items. Consensus was considered achieved
if 75% or more of the SMEs were in agreement. This
was based on both historical precedence and also finding
a balance between some agreement (i.e., 50%) and
complete agreement (i.e., 100%) [39]. Wording changes
were made and clarity sought after the second round.
The third round contained five remaining items: (1)
Length; (2) Complexity; (3) Kept secure; (4) Unique,
and (5) Changing passwords. Although most SMEs
preferred passwords of significant length (15 or more
characters), they also recognized the need to balance
that with the usability challenge it may cause for the
average consumer. Consensus was obtained with respect
to length (10 characters long or longer), uniqueness, and
the importance of keeping passwords safe and secure.
4.2. Objective 2: State Affect
There are advantages and disadvantages to
measuring different types of affect in the context
of a study. For the current study, our interest lies in
how the condition presented to the participants resulted
in specific emotional states. We are not interested in
how they think from an affective perspective about
the specific stimulus (i.e., the treatment), but rather
how they feel in the immediate aftermath of having
received the stimulus. Thus, we measured incidental
state affect rather than integral state affect or trait affect.
The PANAS-X scale was used with specific instructions
provided to measure incidental state affect [7].
4.3. Embedded Videos
As part of the survey, participants were required
to watch one of four different videos depending on
the group to which they had been randomly assigned
by the Qualtrics survey platform. These videos were
developed and iterated upon based on feedback from
undergraduate and graduate students as well as the pilot
study. The lengths of the videos were kept short so as
to maximize attention to the content. They varied in
length from 2:05 (control, coping appraisal only) to 2:29
(threat appraisal only) and then 4:34 (combined threat
and coping appraisal video). The videos can be accessed
from: https://tinyurl.com/password-fear-appeal
For the control group, the goal was to develop a
video that was neutral in tone and without a specific
message. Instrumental music was combined with
various short video clips, such as cars driving, scenery,
sand in the desert, vegetation blowing in the wind, etc.
The threat appraisal only group received
messaging that emphasized the severity of their
passwords being compromised and their level of
vulnerability. Several data breaches were presented,
including the number of accounts impacted and how
that may lead to passwords being compromised as a
result. Other possible ways their passwords could be
compromised was also presented, such as having their
passwords cracked easily because they were too short
in length.
The coping appraisal only group focused on the
three target password hygiene behaviors: 1) length
(10 characters long or longer); 2) Unique passwords
for different websites and systems, and 3) Secure:
the password should be kept safe and secure from
others. A mnemonic was developed so that these
three components would be easier for participants to
remember. P-L-U-S: Passwords should be Long,
Unique, and Secure. The three constructs from
coping appraisal in PMT were emphasized: the steps
an individual can take and how to take them (i.e.,
self-efficacy), the effectiveness of those steps (i.e.,
response efficacy), and the time, energy, and effort
involved in taking those steps (i.e., response costs).
A brief demo of a password manager was given
to demonstrate the efficacy and ease with which such
a tool can address the three components presented to
them. An additional measure was also included in this
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video: combining at least six or more unrelated words
together as an approach to developing long passwords.
The combined group saw a merged version of the video
from groups two and three with threat appraisal followed
by coping appraisal.
5. Results and Analysis
Analysis was conducted using IBM’s Statistical
Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) version 19.0 and
SmartPLS version 3.3.2. The focus of our analysis is
two-fold. First, we want to determine the extent to
which the videos may have influenced our participants’
behavioral intention to engage in creating long, unique,
and secure passwords through an examination of four
different PMT measurement model results. Second,
we are interested in understanding to what extent the
emotions elicited in the four groups vary.
5.1. Pre-Treatment Analyses
Prior to the treatment condition (or control) being
presented to the participant, we asked them about their
level of confidence that they currently perform the
three password hygiene behaviors. A one-way between
subjects ANOVA was performed to assess whether there
was a significant difference between any of the four
experimental groups in this study. None were found.
This suggests that any effect found post-treatment was
most likely due to the treatment itself.
5.2. Measurement Models
A single research method was used in this study:
surveys. Common method bias (CMB) may result in
such cases and should be tested for to determine if it is
a significant issue or not. A test often used to screen
for CMB is the Harman’s single-factor test. While this
test does have some shortcomings [40], it is helpful in
identifying if CMB is an issue within a data set. Less
than 16.1% of the total variance was explained by a
single factor; this is below the maximum threshold of
50%. Although it is important to test for CMB after
data has been collected, it is also important to design
the study in such a way as to minimize the likelihood
of it becoming a problem. In the current study, this
was done by providing instructions to the participants
that there are no right or wrong answers—to just answer
honestly, as well as the use of Amazon’s Mechanical
Turk, which provides a high level of anonymity for
research participants.
Cronbach’s Alpha and composite reliability values
were over the 0.700 minimum threshold, which suggests
that reliability is acceptable for the reflective constructs
used in the measurement models [41]. Additionally,
convergent validity was also found acceptable with the
composite reliability values greater than the AVE for all
of the constructs and greater than the 0.500 minimum
[41]. The measures also demonstrated discriminant
validity as the AVE of the constructs were greater than
the square of the correlations with other constructs;
the cross-loading method of assessing discriminant
validity was also done and was consistent with adequate
discriminant validity [42]. Loading was greater for all
of the indicators for their intended construct than any
other construct. Discriminant validity was also assessed
and supported by using The Heterotrait-Monotrait Ratio
(HTMT) method [43].
The approach outlined in [44] was used to measure
and model the multiple dimensions involved in the
research model, which consists of reflective first-order,
formative second-order constructs (self-efficacy,
response efficacy, and response costs). Since there were
three behaviors in this study, it was important to assess
the coping appraisal components for each of them. For
example, self-efficacy had three dimensions to it—one
for each of the behaviors. Each of these dimensions
were formative for the construct of self-efficacy and
were measured individually using three reflective
indicators that were adapted from the literature.
The five hypotheses were assessed using SmartPLS
3.3.2. In Table 1, we present the individual results for
each of the four measurement models. Three of the four
models only had two out of five hypotheses supported,
while the combined fear and efficacy group had three
out of five hypotheses supported. However, the amount
of variance explained was the highest for the threat
appraisal only group at 53%. Similar to other research
[28], self-efficacy was consistently the best predictor of
behavioral intent in these PMT models.
5.3. State Affect
In addition to evaluating the results to assess support
for or against the hypotheses, we also evaluated state
affect elicited from each of the four groups. Incidental
state affect was measured using the PANAS-X [7, 8]. In
Table 2, we provide the results of a one-way ANOVA
test with Tukey HSD post-hoc analysis. The state affect
dimensions that did not yield a statistically significant
result are not included in the table.
Several interesting observations may be made from
these results. First, there is a clear delineation in the
types of state affect elicited in the groups that included
a fear component versus those that did not. In each and
every case in which the one-way ANOVA test showed
significantly different results between these two types of
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Table 1. PLS-SEM Results for the Four Groups
Group 1: Control; R2 = 35.10%
T statistic P value Supported?
H1: TS 2.121 0.017 Yes
H2: TV 1.198 0.116 No
H3: SE 4.63 p <.001 Yes
H4: RE 0.17 0.433 No
H5: RC 0.914 0.180 No
Group 2: Threat Appraisal Only; R2 = 53%
T statistic P value Supported?
H1: TS 1.621 0.053 No
H2: TV 0.734 0.231 No
H3: SE 4.189 p <.001 Yes
H4: RE 3.479 p <.001 Yes
H5: RC 1.323 0.093 No
Group 3: Coping Appraisal Only; R2 = 37.30%
T statistic P value Supported?
H1: TS 1.45 0.073 No
H2: TV 0.033 0.487 No
H3: SE 3.29 0.001 Yes
H4: RE 0.076 0.47 No
H5: RC 2.75 0.003 Yes
Group 4: Combined; R2 = 39.10%
T statistic P value Supported?
H1: TS 1.701 0.044 Yes
H2: TV 1.388 0.083 No
H3: SE 3.189 0.001 Yes
H4: RE 1.906 0.028 Yes
H5: RC 1.198 0.083 No
groups, the groups that used fear (i.e., threat appraisal)
always elicited greater levels of negative affect and/or
lower levels of positive affect.
Second, one of the most noteworthy issues raised
in Renaud and Dupuis was the assumption that fear
is elicited through fear appeals. This is assumed
without attempting confirmation by measuring either
fear or other emotions taking place [1]. These results
demonstrate why we cannot take the elicitation of fear,
and only fear, for granted. In the fear only group,
hostility was elevated at significantly higher levels than
either the control or coping appraisal only groups.
Joviality is significantly lower for both groups that used
fear as compared to the two groups that did not receive
the threat appraisal messaging of a fear appeal. This
pattern is also observed for state serenity. Therefore,
hypothesis 6 is partially supported with three instances
of a lower order dimension of state negative affect
other than fear being elicited at a higher level when a
fear component was included compared to when it was
not. Likewise, hypothesis 7 is also partially supported
with five instances of a lower order dimension of state
positive affect being elicited at a lower level when fear
was included compared to when it was not. Serenity
is not considered a lower order dimension of either
positive or negative affect [7].
Third, the differences noted here in the types and
nature of the affect elicited were the likely result
of watching very short videos of approximately two
to less than five minutes in duration, depending on
the specific video. However, even from that short
encounter with fear used in two of the four groups,
we see several instances of a variety of negative types
of state affect elicited. What does this suggest for
more pronounced fear appeal efforts, including repeated
negative messaging by an employer or the government?
6. Discussion
Dodsworth [2] argues that “happy endings are not
written in the language of coercive control.” We
discovered that the use of fear caused our participants
to create stronger passwords. Yet, they also led to
negative affect. When people experience negativity
towards something, they are likely to avoid it: to be
reluctant to engage enthusiastically with the password
creation process in the future [45]. We have to wonder
what the consequences of this negative affect will be in a
week, a month or a year. Moreover, what will the impact
be on their general well-being [46]?
6.1. Implications
This study provides important insights into the use
of fear appeals within the cybersecurity domain. It
demonstrated that providing messaging on the nature
of a threat (i.e., threat appraisal) and what can be
done to address the threat (i.e., coping appraisal)
may help engender behavioral change toward the
targeted behavior(s). However, the extent to which
this messaging is delivered (or not) influences the
manner in which PMT may help explain their behavioral
intentions. Other than perceived threat vulnerability,
which has been problematic in much of the PMT
literature, all of the hypotheses received at least some
support in one or more of the four models. Fear appeals
even lower in complexity than done here and with focus
on a single recommended action can be effective, at least
in the short term [17, 24]. This suggests that throwing
the kitchen sink at end users may be too burdensome,
and perhaps, as a result, less effective.
Additionally, the results on state affect suggest that
affect needs to be measured on a more regular basis
when fear is employed. Fear is rarely measured, despite
the fact that a fear appeal is being used. To the
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Table 2. Differences in Dimensions of State Affect in Fear and Non-Fear Conditions
Construct Group A Group B Mean Difference (A-B) Std. Error Sig.
State Negative Affect
F(3,795)=8.149, p<.001
Threat Appraisal Control .29281* .06531 .000Coping Appraisal .24109* .06589 .002
Combined Control .18336* .06531 .026Coping Appraisal .13164 .06589 .190
State Fear
F(3,795)=7.881, p<.001
Threat Appraisal Control .31297* .07018 .000Coping Appraisal .24877* .07080 .003
Combined Control .19689* .07018 .026Coping Appraisal .13268 .07080 .240
State Hostility
F(3,795)=4.943, p=.002
Threat Appraisal Control .19764* .06129 .007Coping Appraisal .19722* .06184 .008
Combined Control .11887 .06129 .212Coping Appraisal .11845 .06184 .222
State Guilt
F(3,795)=3.283, p=.020
Threat Appraisal Control .19168* .06857 .027Coping Appraisal .15698 .06918 .106
Combined Control .13198 .06857 .218Coping Appraisal .09728 .06918 .496
State Joviality
F(3,795)=13.781, p<.001
Threat Appraisal Control -.61638* .10477 .000Coping Appraisal -.44398* .10570 .000
Combined Control -.44660* .10477 .000Coping Appraisal -.27421* .10570 .047
State Self-Assurance
F(3,795)=3.336, p=.019
Threat Appraisal Control -.26753* .09405 .024Coping Appraisal -.17394 .09489 .259
Combined Control -.22027 .09405 .090Coping Appraisal -.12667 .09489 .541
State Serenity
F(3,795)=21.494, p<.001
Threat Appraisal Control -.72639* .10391 .000Coping Appraisal -.60143* .10484 .000
Combined Control -.53734* .10391 .000Coping Appraisal -.41237* .10484 .001
* The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level.
extent that fear and fear alone is measured, these results
indicate that we may be missing a significant amount
of the complicated picture on how other affective
components are elicited from a fear appeal, whether
positive or negative types of affect.
6.2. Ethical Considerations
In deploying fear in any cybersecurity context,
it is important not to ignore ethical considerations.
Dupuis and Renaud [3] proposed six ethical principles
to guide cybersecurity fear appeal experiments and
deployment. These are: (1) obtain IRB approval, (2)
make the benefits of cybersecurity salient, (3) only use
deception if it can be rigorously justified, (4) provide
a feasible recommended action (with the implication
that feasibility will be verified), (5) calibrate during
deployment (with the implication that the option to
cease and desist will be considered if undue negative
consequences are evident), and (6) debrief targets of
fear appeals. If the fear appeal cannot be used within
these constraints, deployers should carefully re-consider
going ahead with the use of fear appeals.
6.3. Limitations
There are several limitations worth noting. First, this
was a single survey using a crowd-sourced participant
pool. While compensation was considered fair by most,
MTurk workers do have an incentive to complete the
work as quickly as possible. Thus, some responses
and their overall attention may not be optimal for the
messaging being delivered.
Second, data was collected for this study via a survey
and no other method. Thus, common method bias is a
concern [47]. Multiple quality control procedures were
implemented to help address this concern. Additionally,
the participant population is essentially anonymous to
the research team. Thus, while certain elements of the
procedures employed and participant pool used help to
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minimize the likelihood that common method bias was
a significant factor in the results obtained, it remains a
concern nonetheless.
Third, the collected data comes from a single
snapshot in time for our participants. This was not
a longitudinal study and we do not know whether the
difference in behavioral intentions lasted beyond the
completion of the survey. Likewise, we do not know
if the behavioral intentions themselves resulted in any
actual change in behavior.
Finally, we do not know if any emotional harm
resulted from the fear that was elicited. While this
study was considered low risk and approved as exempt
from a full IRB review, part of the challenge with using
fear appeals is the balance between enhanced coping
appraisal being offset by the possible harms that could
result from being scared into doing something.
7. Conclusion
In a world in which we are constantly bombarded
with fear to try and cause a change in behavior, it is
important that we begin to understand the very nuanced
nature of eliciting a specific emotion and how that may
impact behavior and one’s overall emotional state.
Is the use of fear appeals worth it? That is a difficult
question that cannot be answered here. However, what
we do know is that we should not take for granted that
fear appeals work in the long-term and that something
other than fear is likely also to be elicited. Emotions are
complicated, as our results demonstrate.
7.1. Future Research
The current study raises several issues and suggests
three primary considerations for future research. First,
more research is needed in examining threat and coping
appraisals separately to better understand how their
associated constructs are related to behavioral intentions
and changes in behavior, whether modeled using PMT
or other theoretical approaches.
Second, fear levels should be measured when fear
appeals are used (e.g., [17]), but fear should not be the
only emotion measured. The current study suggests that
using fear may well lead to higher levels of fear, but
also higher levels of other types of negative emotions
and reduced levels of positive emotions.
Third, more longitudinal studies are needed to assess
the long-term impact of triggering a short-term negative
emotion. These studies should examine whether any
long-term changes in emotional states have occurred
and whether success was achieved with respect to the
targeted behavior(s) after a delay of some weeks.
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